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In this issue, we are excited to bring you two reviews that are different from 
the book reviews we typically publish.  The first is an in-depth review by 
Jeffrey B. Morris and Shari G. Newman of The Judge in a Democracy, a 
timely book by Aharon Barak, the recently retired President of the Israeli 
Supreme Court and a world-renowned jurist.  The second is a review of a new 
database by Oxford University Press called “International Law in Domestic 
Courts.”  This important new database will undoubtedly become an essential 
research tool.  In the future, we hope to publish more in-depth reviews and 
more reviews of electronic resources.  Enjoy! 
 
Thomas Mills, Book Review Editor 
Research Attorney 
Cornell Law Library 
 
 
 
Legal Aspects of the Cyprus Problem: Annan Plan and EU Accession.  By 
Frank Hoffmeister.  Leiden, The Netherlands: Koninklijke Brill NV, 2006. 
Pp. ix, 289. ISBN 90-04-15223-7.  €95.00; US$124.00.   
 
Legal Aspects of the Cyprus Problem: Annan Plan and EU Accession 
is a concise discussion of a multi-faceted deadlock that has been ongoing for 
over three decades.  Frank Hoffmeister sheds new light on this international 
spectacle, which has involved a growing number of parties since the European 
Union’s rise.  The Cyprus problem indeed has been written about for decades 
as the situation has developed and become more complex.  The legal aspects 
alone have occupied the research and discussion of international lawyers, 
politicians, and academicians alike.   
As is the case with every dispute, in the Cyprus issue there are at least 
two sides to consider.  Hoffmeister sincerely attempts to address the position 
of all concerned parties; however, the UN position, or more specifically the 
Annan Plan(s),390 seems to hold the favored position throughout the text.391  
As the subtitle suggests, the Annan Plan comes to the forefront of the 
                                                 
390 There have been five versions between 2002 and 2004 but collectively they are 
referred to as the Annan Plan. 
391 See, for example, The Annan Plan for Cyprus available online 
http://www.hri.org/docs/annan/ 
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discussion and legal analysis more often than the position of other parties.  
Given Hoffmeister’s credentials, this is not surprising.  He was after all the 
EU expert seconded to the UN for the preparation of the latest version of the 
Annan plan and an official at the Cyprus desk at Directorate-General on 
Enlargement of the European Commission.  Although this book is not official 
or semi-official, as the author clearly states, it is based on his experience 
dealing with the Cyprus problem.  This is not stated to take away from the 
legal analysis.  Indeed, Hoffmeister provides a notable assessment of the legal 
dilemma and brings the reader up to date with the current situation.   
In fewer than three hundred pages, the author has sketched a rough 
anatomy of the Cyprus problem for the novice reader.  The extensive 
footnotes are accompanied by appendices, containing a few of the referenced 
legal doctrines, followed by an impressive bibliography and a scant index.  
The chronological arrangement of topics and a further division of each 
chapter into facts and legal analysis offers a polished presentation and a 
pleasant read.  In particular, the historical discussion of the relations between 
the parties involved is noteworthy and necessary for the legal analysis of each 
stage.  The delicate brokering of the UN and the EU is integrated seamlessly 
into the discussion throughout the text.  The author is successful in 
condensing the facts and rendering the legal application.  Excluded from this 
text are “geostrategic interests of the actors involved, negotiation tactics [and] 
the political interaction of their steps.”  However, these are addressed 
selectively to give a reasonable account of the state of affairs.  
This title would be a valuable addition to any international law 
collection and a fine beginning into developing an understanding of the legal 
aspects of the Cyprus problem. 
 
Aslihan Bulut 
Reference Librarian 
Arthur W. Diamond Law Library 
Columbia University School of Law 
New York, NY USA 
 
 
EU Administrative Governance.  Edited by Herwig C.H. Hofmann and 
Alexander H. Türk.  Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 
2006.  Pp. viii, 622.  ISBN 1-84542-285-6.  £95.00; US$160.00. 
 
 This book is a detailed illustration of European Union’s (EU) 
complex, multi-level administrative governance system.  It is a compilation of 
multiple chapters written as individual essays by various European and 
American legal scholars, legal practitioners, and political scientists.  The key 
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to this collection of essays is the highlighted cooperation among 
administrators in Europe that has become the backbone of the EU’s unique 
system of government and governance.  The book is divided into three main 
areas: Part I (Policy Process) contains three chapters; Part II (Sectoral Areas) 
contains eight chapters; and Part III (Cross-Sectional Analysis) contains five 
chapters as well as a conclusion chapter.  Each chapter is well cited, 
illustrated, and followed by a useful bibliography.  
Chapter 1 focuses on the several administrative and institutional 
ambiguities presented by the EU.  Most notably, the focus is on the EU’s mix 
of national, functional, and supranational governance dynamics.  Particular 
emphasis has been put on how the European Commission controls and polices 
expert groups in order to influence and manage the policy-making agenda. 
Using small and large expert groups to set the Commission agenda has 
activated the dynamics of instrumental rationality and path dependency. 
These expert groups are used as arenas for deliberation, brainstorming, and 
intergovernmental conflict solving.  This is where complex technical 
problems are solved, according to the authors of this chapter.  As a final note, 
the chapter challenges the current intergovernmental divide in European 
integration scholarship by studying the integration of domestic and EU 
institutions in the agenda setting phases of the EU decision-making process. 
This is a dense chapter, which is well cited and supported by the latest 
literature in the field of administrative law.  The analysis employed here is 
strictly from a social science perspective.   
Chapter 2 reflects the fact, which is well documented by the authors, 
that administrators play a crucial role within the EU decision-making process 
even though the actual number of staff working within the EC institutions is 
comparatively low.  The main conclusion drawn by the study presented in this 
chapter shows that EC preparatory bodies do not just carry out certain 
preparatory work; they also help broker compromises.  This chapter is a study 
of both roles and practices of preparatory bodies of the EC as well as the roles 
of administrators.  It is a well thought out, thorough study that helps explain 
the complex intermingling of various administrative facets of the EU. 
Throughout their analysis, the authors focus on improvements for current 
regulatory mechanisms.  
Chapter 3 focuses on the administrative policy implementation.  The 
current and future constitutional structures, under the EU/EC treaty and under 
the treaty establishing a constitution for Europe, are no more than a 
framework.  This chapter explains both the legality of the delegation of 
administrative powers and the constitutional principles of administrative law 
in the form of substantial and procedural fundamental rights.  The main 
conclusion of the chapter is that broad constitutional structures do not change 
the fact that the details of structures of EU administrative governance for 
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implementation are developed by secondary legislation and institutional 
practice in every policy area.  With respect to the protection of individual 
rights, this chapter does not analyze the types of legal acts that can be the 
result of administrative action in the EU.  Instead, it takes more of an inside 
point of view by systemizing and giving an overview of forms of co-operation 
between administrations from different levels.  
 Part II of the book entitled “Sectoral Areas” contains the next 8 
chapters.  This portion of the book analyzes various administrative law areas. 
First, the authors examine the comitology in EU’s environmental policy and 
European governance of food safety.  Next, the authors analyze the 
modernization of EC antitrust enforcement, the need for a single EU securities 
regulator, and the relationship of administrative governance to state aid 
policy.  The last three chapters analyze asylum and immigration policy, EU 
police and judicial co-operation, and the common foreign and security policy 
as they individually relate to administrative governance.  Each chapter makes 
excellent use of supporting documentation and provides a useful, if not 
familiar, critique of the procedural mechanism from its theoretical basis to its 
implementation stages.  This section of the book is strong because it makes 
excellent use of data as well as available legislation to ensure that readers 
arrive at the same conclusion as the author.  Nevertheless, each chapter 
suffers from the “individual essay” syndrome.  Instead of blending together, 
each chapter may be read as an individual essay with little or no connection to 
the chapter following it. 
Part III of the book entitled “Cross-section” analysis contains the final 
4 chapters.  The authors first review and analyze the EU committee 
governance and they conclude that a considerable amount of time and energy 
is spent on these assignments by representatives of the individual states.  The 
study successfully shows that smaller EU member states spend more time on 
these committees than their larger counterparts.  The next essay deals with the 
thorny issue of comitology and European Courts.  The author of this chapter 
exquisitely demonstrates the fact that on occasion courts have been 
inconsistent and unpredictable when applying existing general administrative 
law principles.  The author seems optimistic about the progress of comitology 
in Europe although the early results have left the final results quite 
unpredictable.   
The last two chapters examine various models and scenarios faced by 
the EU in its quest for a form of unified administrative governance.  The 
theoretical approach by the authors is well documented and thorough but it 
lacks much practical appeal outside the realm of law practice.  The reader is 
not only made aware of the current problems of democratic legitimacy in a 
supranational government but also of potential new problems that may arise. 
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The chapter is well thought out and timely but largely a theoretical analysis in 
light of the missing constitutional piece currently plaguing the EU.   
Overall, this work is a critical analysis of the current body of EC 
administrative governance up to February 2006.  The book is well researched 
and exquisitely cited so to provide its readers with a quick reference to the 
most pertinent case law holdings and legislation in this growing area of law. 
This work, however, is a compilation of individual essays rather than a 
cohesive, free flowing text.  The book contains numerous references and 
notes, tables of various study results, as well as a table of legislation necessary 
in any EU law text.  The book is not conventionally organized, and it lacks the 
easy follow through reading of a classic textbook.  Nevertheless its exquisite 
analysis of a difficult regulatory arena warrants a recommendation for law 
schools that offer comparative law courses or courses in European Union law.  
 
  Dragomir Cosanici 
Head of Information Services 
Indiana University School of Law at Indianapolis 
Indianapolis, IN USA 
 
      
Fresh Water and International Economic Law.  Edited by Edith Brown 
Weiss, Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, and Nathalie Bernasconi-
Osterwalder.  Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2005.  Pp. xxv, 
480.  ISBN 0-19-927467-3.  £74.95; US$145.00 
 
In one way or another, water plays a role in the provision of all basic 
human needs and luxuries:  ecology, health, agriculture, sanitation, 
transportation, recreation, culture, energy, manufactured products, etc.  No 
other natural resource is more universally essential or more diverse in its 
beneficial uses to humans than fresh water.   
As an introductory text in 15 chapters, Fresh Water and International 
Economic Law “focuses on the implications of the use of water as an 
economic good, the implications of commoditization of fresh water, and the 
bearing of international economic law on water issues.”  The predominant 
theme throughout the book is that society’s interest in promoting the equitable 
and efficient use of this essential resource is reflected both in the symbolic 
human rights view of fresh water and in its economic value.  
This timely volume acknowledges all of the complex and conflict-
ridden issues revolving around water uses in the context of currently existing 
trade instruments, regulatory mechanisms, and contemporary legal thought.  
Is there a human right to water?  What does that right encompass?  Can we 
balance competing interests and encourage efficiency?  How will scarce water 
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resources be allocated?  How will economic models look and operate?  How 
will conflicts be resolved?   
The movement in water management, which is not new but on the 
rise, from supply augmentation (dam projects and storage reservoirs) to 
reallocation (water transfers) argues that markets rather than administrators 
should determine the comparative value of alternative water uses.  However, 
international efforts to manage, protect, and distribute water must consider the 
multiple uses of water and the complex interactions among users.  While 
international trade and privatization seem like useful mechanisms to equalize 
access and increase efficiency, significant challenges are also present.  
The authors of this book provide a practical analysis of international 
trade agreements and other documents that are or may be applied to water 
resources and the roles of international organizations in these issues.  A 
number of the chapters analyze historical and/or new legal theories relevant to 
water that intersect with trade agreements and the mechanisms by which they 
are implemented.  Often, the authors lay out background on general economic 
theories, legal theories of property rights, and statistics relating to water 
resources.  Throughout, the geography of specific examples is diverse.   
The five broad topics of the book cover:  (I) issues arising out of 
transfers of fresh water; (II) water services and the right to water; (III) 
groundwater use and agricultural subsidies; (IV) water and investment; and 
(V) resolving conflicts over water.  In Part I, the authors analyze how water 
disputes arise, compare US constitutional law to international trade law, and 
discuss how trade laws apply to the transportation of water and when water 
becomes a “product” or “good” subject to trade laws. 
The contributions in part II explain how the right to water is implicit 
in legal human rights instruments, discuss the extent to which water-related 
services (e.g., sanitation) may be covered by the General Agreement on Trade 
in Services (GATS), and explore how GATS rules may detrimentally impact a 
government’s ability to regulate privatized water services.  
Part III reveals the effects of agricultural subsidies, recognizes the 
divergent meanings of “water use efficiency” and the diverse objectives 
regarding water management, and explores the question:  Does international 
trade law offer a means to reduce or eliminate detrimental subsidies? In Part 
IV, the authors discuss such topics as investment rules and foreign investment 
protection, how these rules affect the ability of governments to manage and 
protect water resources, specific cases decided under NAFTA, how 
investment treaties can help settle water disputes, and participatory standards 
for local communities.  Finally, Part V examines inter-State mechanisms for 
dispute resolution, procedures available to non-State actors, and the roles of 
transparency, effective public participation and amicus curiae in resolving 
water disputes. 
170 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF LEGAL INFORMATION [Vol. 35.1 
 
 
Fresh Water and International Economic Law is one of the latest of 
11 titles published since 2001 in the Oxford University International 
Economic Law series.  This compilation was inspired in part by two 
exploratory seminars in 2002 and 2003 organized by the Georgetown 
University Law Center and likely was encouraged by the United Nations’ 
official recognition of the right to water in 2002. 
Resources in the volume include a two-page list of acronyms and 
abbreviations; 15 tables, figures and maps; and eight Appendixes.  The 
Appendixes include excerpts from relevant international documents, a 
bibliography, and a three-page list of water-related web sites. 
Although some chapters admit a utopian vision and a more truly global view 
of resource use and human survival than currently seems possible, the text 
generally offers balanced and thoughtful suggestions for resolution of the 
issues presented.  As a timely introduction to international trade law and to 
current legal thought on fresh water issues specifically, Fresh Water and 
International Economic Law is a complement to other legal materials on 
international, economic, environmental, human rights, and natural resources 
topics. 
 
Debra Denslaw 
Ruth Lilly Law Library 
Indiana University School of Law – Indianapolis 
Indianapolis, IN USA 
 
 
International Law in Domestic Courts (ILDC) 
Oxford University Press (2006-) 
http://ildc.oxfordlawreports.com 
http://www.oxfordonline.com/freetrials 
£1300-1500/$2000-2490 for academic institutions 
For more information, please contact Julie McGeough at OUP, (212) 726-
6419; julie.mcgeough@oup.com 
 
This new online resource from Oxford University Press (OUP) is a 
welcome addition to the realm of international legal research materials.  
International Law in Domestic Courts (ILDC) is a database containing cases 
from national courts that deal with international law topics from over 60 
jurisdictions.  The special features include English translations of cases and 
scholarly commentary by experts highlighting the most important points of 
international law.  The cases are supposed to be the ones that are “setting 
precedents, reaffirming standards, or are otherwise addressing some critical 
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issue in international law.”392  More detailed information about how cases are 
selected is available on the website.393   
According to the website, “[t]he cases are selected by local reporters 
in conjunction with the OUP editorial board and feature expert commentary, 
full texts of judgments in their original language and translations of key 
passages of non-English judgments into English.”  The reporters come from a 
variety of jurisdictions and many work in major law schools.  Depending on 
the country, there may be one or more than ten reporters.  The reporters 
provide the bulk of the content:  they suggest cases for inclusion, draft the 
reports, revise reports after the editors have reviewed them, and supply the 
text of the judgments (often indicating which sections should be translated). 
They also keep the content fresh by notifying OUP of changes or updates to 
the cases.  
The Editorial Board is comprised of people who were chosen based 
on their expertise in the application of international law in domestic law.  
They also represent various regions of the world: Europe, Africa, Latin 
America, Israel and the Middle East, North America, and Asia.  The editorial 
board works under the direction of André Nollkaemper and Erika de Wet, 
professors at the University of Amsterdam Center for International Law.394  
This editorial board is unique because it was involved during the conceptual 
stages of the project and they continue to provide their expertise by reviewing 
and editing the case notes and commentaries.   
                                                 
392 47 Law Librarian Newsletter 1 (Winter 2006/2007).   
393 
http://ildc.oxfordlawreports.com/uid=105396/subscriber/about_ildc?topic=about_ildc
_main. 
394 http://www.jur.uva.nl/aciluk/. 
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Figure 1: ILDC Homepage 
Basically, ILDC is a straight-forward database to use.  You can search 
or browse the database.  Right now, browsing works well since there is not a 
large number of cases.  As you can see from Figure 2, there are 17 categories 
and the total number of cases for each category is indicated by the number on 
the right.  Not surprisingly, there are more cases in the areas of human rights 
and criminal law than in economic or environmental law.  Browsing by 
jurisdiction and alphabetically by case name is also available.   
 
 
Figure 2: Key Category Browse Page 
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Two search mechanisms are provided: a quick search and an 
advanced search (see Figure 3).  The “Help” pages provide good instructions 
on how to use both search functions, along with tips on how to combine them.  
The advanced search has several search options.  The “key category” field 
contains the same topical areas as the browse feature.  There is an extensive 
keyword search as well as fields for jurisdiction, parties, and search terms.  
The free text search field and the quick search allow for stemming, use of 
Boolean operators, and phrase searching.  Searches can be limited by date and 
to either the headnotes or judgments only.   
 
 
Figure 3: Advanced Search Page 
Each document (report) in the database has the following components, 
including a good deal of value-added content:  
• information about the case (jurisdiction, citations, date of decision, 
court, judges, procedural stage, subsequent case development) 
• key categories (searchable via the advanced search) 
• keywords (searchable via the advanced search) 
• core issues of the case 
• facts  
• holding 
• commentary by the reporter (also called commentator, the name is 
listed on the navigation side of the report) 
• judgment, both in the original language and an English translation 
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The navigation bar on the left side of the screen allows you to jump to 
various sections of the document and provides several print options (Figure 
4).  A truly valuable feature is the ability to access the original judgment as 
well as the translation (see Figure 5).   
 
 
Figure 4: Sample from a Section of a Report 
 
 
Figure 5: Original Judgment 
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Other features include a list of newly added, updated, and upcoming 
case reports,  and a new case alerts email service (see Figure 6).  
 
 
Figure 6: Sample of Case Alert Email 
The database does have some limitations.  On the content side, the 
biggest limitation is the number of cases, approximately 200 cases at the time 
of the writing of this review.  It is important to note that the archive of cases is 
not extensive and for several jurisdictions the collection only goes back to 
2000.  However, new content is constantly being added.  
On the functionality side, there is no way to save searches or mark 
what you find to create a cite list.  It would be handy to be able to mark cases 
and email them or create a list to email or print.  An email feature that allows 
you to have the data in text format with live links would also be useful.  
Currently, the only output feature is print (in HTML), so you cannot 
download or email easily.  Also, you can only print the entire report or only 
the headnotes.  Other limitations include the inability to search by original 
case citation (although you can search via the fee text field) and there is no 
way to sort or limit an existing search.  
ILDC is still a work in progress with many future developments 
planned.  OUP plans to add better ways to refine searches and sort results; 
include the ability to browse by year; add additional print options (such as 
printing documents as PDFs); and make a complete list of all of the cases 
accepted for inclusion available on the site.  In addition to new functionality, 
there is a plan to add a collection of jurisprudence from international courts 
and tribunals.  The first of these, on international criminal law (edited by 
William Schabas) will be ready in November, 2007.  Another module will 
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focus on human rights cases from the UN treaty bodies as well as the cases 
from other human rights systems.  While these collections will require a 
separate subscription, users will be able to search across collections using one 
interface.   
The practice of States, which includes the decisions issued by 
domestic courts, is important when dealing with the application and 
interpretation of international law.  In the past, locating this information was 
challenging at best.  Researchers had to comb through State yearbooks on 
international law, International Law Reports,395 and other tools that lack some 
of ILDC’s strengths, namely timeliness and being able to search 
electronically.  Therefore, I highly recommend this database for those who are 
interested in the relationship between international and domestic law as well 
as those interested in dispute settlement.  As this database develops, it will 
become an important tool for scholars, practitioners, judges, and students.   
 
Marci Hoffman 
Associate Director and International & Foreign Law Librarian 
University of California, Berkeley School of Law Library 
 Berkeley, CA USA 
 
 
Can Might Make Rights? Building the rule of law after military 
interventions.  By Jane Stromseth, David Wippman, and Rose Brooks. 
Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006.  Pp. x, 414.  ISBN 
978-0-521-67801-8.  £17.99; US$29.99 
 
According to the authors of Can Might Make Rights? Building the 
rule of law after military interventions, “building the rule of law is a constant 
balancing act.”  There is no one path or process that will always work to 
establish the rule of law in a post-intervention society.  Interveners must be 
aware of the possible pitfalls as they approach the establishment of the rule of 
law.  They must have a sense of the cultural framework of the country and be 
mindful of this as they consider the legal institutions that should be 
developed.  Historically, there are numerous examples of failed attempts to 
establish the rule of law because the interveners have not considered the 
whole process and have focused on specific aspects, such as rebuilding the 
police force, establishing the legislature, or writing a constitution.  While 
these are certainly important goals, creating the rule of law is much more 
complex than those individual steps.  
                                                 
395 International Law Reports (1950-) and Annual Digest and Reports of Public 
International Law Cases (1919-1949). 
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With this in mind, Jane Stromseth, David Wippman, and Rosa Brooks 
have written Can Might Make Rights: Building the Rule of Law After Military 
Interventions.  Their goal for the book is “to offer enough theoretical and 
historical background to enable readers to contextualize and understand the 
basic dilemmas inherent in interventions designed to build the rule of law 
while offering concrete suggestions for getting it right in the future.”  The 
book was originally conceived with a focus on humanitarian interventions and 
the development of the rule of law following that type of intervention.  
However, in the wake of September 11th, it evolved to include interventions 
motivated by national security concerns.  The authors realized that although 
the basis for intervention was different, the problems that arose in post-
conflict attempts to establish the rule of law were similar.   
In the introductory chapter, the authors discuss the rule of law using 
the metaphor of building a house.  This is a helpful technique because it 
clearly sets forth the vital steps of establishing the rule of law, yet it places 
them in a context that may be more familiar.  Important aspects include 
understanding how previous houses have been built, getting the proper 
blueprint, gathering the necessary resources, and showing the occupants that 
the house is worth waiting for.  Applying these concepts to the creation of the 
rule of law, what is needed are “a basic theoritcial and historical background, 
a blueprint, building blocks, money, appropriately skilled people, and a 
cultural commitment to the underlying project.”  The chapters of the book 
follow this structure and discuss these steps in sequence.  Examples from 
recent post-intervention attempts to establish the rule of law in countries such 
as Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, East Timor, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Afghanistan, 
and Iraq are included throughout the book.  These are helpful because they 
put the theoritcial concepts into a more understandable context.  
Chapters two and three examine the historical and theoretical 
framework.  Understanding this background and learning from it are key 
elements for current attempts to build the rule of law.  Chapter 2 begins with a 
discussion of the general international legal bases for intervention.  It gives 
examples of interventions that were considered legitimate, such as 
Afghanistan and Somalia, and those that were more controversial, such as 
Kosovo and Iraq.  This discussion is relevant because the perceived 
legitimacy and/or legality of the intervention can have a strong impact on the 
effort to build the rule of law.  Chapter 3 presents a detailed discussion of 
what exactly the rule of law is.  As the authors point out there is no single 
agree-upon definition for the rule of law.  An Analysis of the different 
theories relating to how to conceptualize the rule of law is presented, as is a 
historical look at rule of law programs and how they have been arranged.  
Following this background discussion, the authors present their definition of 
the rule of law, which they describe as “descriptive and pragmatic” and which 
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serves as an introduction to their approach to creating the rule of law that they 
call a “synergistic approach.”  The synergistic approach has three key 
elements; it is end-based, adaptive, and systemic.  Each of these elements is 
explained within the context of building the rule of law.   
In Chapter 4, the authors discuss the importance of “the blueprint for 
the political reconstruction of the affected country.”  Blueprints are intended 
to set out the steps by which the rule of law can be established.  Out of 
necessity, they will be developed on a case-by-case basis because each 
country has a different cultural background and each intervention has a 
specific underlying cause.  The chapter uses a number of different countries as 
examples to illustrate the blueprint design process and to highlight some of 
the successes and failures that can occur.   
The major building blocks for the creation of the rule of law are 
outlined in chapters five, six, and seven.  These chapters address the issues 
with the application of the “synergistic approach” developed in Chapter 3, 
which shows the ways that this approach can improve the progress toward the 
rule of law.  The focus of chapter 5 is on reestablishing security, which in the 
authors’ opinion is the most important step toward building the rule of law.  
Chapter 6 provides a look at how to build or rebuild the justice system, which 
includes not only the courts, but also the police force and prisons.  Respect for 
human rights and determining how to hold people accountable for past 
atrocities is the topic in Chapter 7.  These chapters are full of clear, well 
thought out discussions and provide examples of how they have been handled 
in recent post-conflict situations.   
The last major factor to be considered is the cultural commitment to 
the rule of law.  Attempts to establish the rule of law will have a hard time 
succeeding in the absence of the acceptance by the people who are going to 
subject to it.  In Chapter 8, the authors discuss the necessity of creating a rule 
of law culture, where the vast majority of the people understand the value of 
the legal institutions and support them.  They describe both the important 
issues and possible pitfalls present during the development of a rule of law 
culture.  Finally, Chapter 9 applies the concepts of the synergistic approach to 
the area of rule of law assistance and explores how effective planning and 
coordinated efforts among the different international actors can produce a 
more successful rule of law structure.   
Ms. Stromseth, Mr. Wippman, and Ms. Brooks specifically state that 
Can Might Make Rights is not a how-to manual.  Their purpose is to set forth 
a practical and pragmatic framework that can be referenced as interveners and 
others begin the process of developing the rule of law in post-conflict  
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situations.  In this regard, the book succeeds, as it sets out their ‘synergistic 
approach’ for implementing the rule of law in a manner that is understandable 
and useful.   
 
Karin Johnsrud 
Reference Librarian 
Arthur W. Diamond Law Library 
Columbia University School of Law 
New York, NY USA 
 
 
The Judge in a Democracy.  By Aharon Barak.  Princeton, New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 2006.  Pp. 360.  ISBN 978-0-691-12017-1.  
US$29.95. 
 
 Princeton University Press has just published another book written by 
the prolific President of the Israeli Supreme Court, Aharon Barak.396  With the 
exception of three chapters singled out in this review, this work of the 
internationally famous jurist has little that will be novel to anyone who has 
given considerable thought to the job of judging.  However, for those who 
may be interested in the underpinnings of the philosophy of an activist, 
audacious judge (the “John Marshall of Israel”), or those who may be 
interested in getting a sense of the work of an impressive judicial system, this 
book is well worth reading.397  
To better comprehend the significance of Barak’s book and to 
understand what has shaped his judicial philosophy, brief sections on Israel’s 
history, governance, and the work of its Supreme Court precede its 
consideration.  
 
A Capsule Background on the History of Israel, Its Governance, and the Work 
of the Israeli Supreme Court 
 
                                                 
396  THE JUDGE IN A DEMOCRACY is a substantially expanded version of an 
article that originally appeared in the Harvard Law Review. See Aharon Barak, 
Foreword: The Role of a Supreme Court in a Democracy, 116 HARV.L.REV. 16 
(2002). See also Aharon Barak, The Role of a Supreme Court in a Democracy, and 
the Fight Against Terrorism, 58 U. MIAM. L.REV. 125 (2003). 
397  See, e.g., David B. Sentelle, “Judicial Discretion: Is one More of a Good 
Thing too Much?,” 88 MICH.L.Rev. 1828 (1990) (reviewing AHARON BARAK, 
JUDICIAL DISCRETION (1989). 
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Surely, the judiciary of a small nation, besieged for its more than fifty 
year history, lacking a constitution,398 and yet remaining throughout a republic 
with an independent judiciary almost as protective of human rights as any in 
the world is worth attention.  Moreover, there are those who believe that the 
judicialization of politics has “probably proceeded further in Israel than in any 
other democratic country.”399   
Israel, gained its independence in 1948.  Intended as one of two states 
to be created from the mandated Palestine territory, Israel was attacked by its 
neighbors almost immediately after it declared its independence and has been 
in a state of emergency ever since.  From the birth of the state until 1977, the 
Labor Party (Mapai) has dominated Israeli governance.  Since that time Israel 
has been governed by short-term Parliamentary coalitions unable to give 
strong leadership in dealing with major problems.  From its birth, Israel has 
had to come to grips with major problems that would trouble any nation.  
Additionally, Israel is faced with issues associated with being a Jewish state, 
including assimilation of Jewish immigrants, relations between synagogue 
and state, and terrorism.400 The political culture of the Jewish state has been 
greatly affected by four major wars; waves of immigration from Europe, 
Muslim states, and the former Soviet Union; and the debate over the future of 
the territories seized in the Six Day War of 1967, a debate which grew in 
intensity after the 1973 Yom Kippur War.  If in the early years of the State 
there were deep divisions between the very religious and the secular 
Ashkenazim from Northern Europe, almost sixty years later the polity is not 
only divided between those two groups, but also the Sephardim, the Russian 
immigrants, and the  Arabs.401  
Public cynicism born of rampant partisanship, self-interested politics, 
and ineffectual governance eased the way for the expansion of judicial power. 
Israel’s judges, particularly its Supreme Court, proved ready to decide 
                                                 
398  On the controversial question as to whether Israel now has a written 
constitution, see infra, pp. 17ff. 
399  Martin Edelman, Israel in THE GLOBAL EXPANSION OF JUDICIAL 
POWER 403 (C.Neal Tate & Torbjorn Vallinder eds., 1995) 403; Hillel Neuer, 
Aharon Barak’s Revolution, AZURE, Winter 1998,  at  13, 18 available at 
http://www.azure.org.il (then follow “Neuer” hyperlink);Ruth Gavison, The Israeli 
Constitutional Process: Legislative Ambivalence and Judicial Resolute Drive 18 (Ctr. 
for the Study of Rationality, Discussion Paper # 380, 2005). 
400  Alan Dowty, Emergency Powers in Israel: The Devaluation of Crisis in 
COPING WITH CRISIS: HOW GOVERNMENTS DEAL WITH EMERGENCIES 
(Shao-chuan Leng, 1990)1, 2; Aharon Barak, Freedom of Speech in Israel: The 
Impact of the American Constitution”, 8 TEL AVIV U. STUD.L. 241, 248 (1985). 
401  Edelman, supra note 4, at 403; Gavison, supra note 4, at 21; Emily Bazelon, 
Let There Be Law, LEGAL. AFF., May-June 2002, at 25, 29. 
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difficult policy questions regardless of political fallout.  As a result, many 
questions of policy were transformed into legal questions by attorneys and 
resolved by the courts.  The political branches often felt relieved, and Israel’s 
courts became more controversial.402  
The writing of a constitution for Israel was delayed by the war that 
immediately followed the creation of the State.  This result did not displease 
Israel’s first Prime Minister, David Ben-Gurion, who saw advantages for the 
governing Mapai Party from a Knesset unconfined by a constitution and who 
also realized that his coalition government would be jeopardized by a battle 
between Orthodox and secular forces over the role of Jewish law in the new 
state.  Instead of writing a constitution, a process was agreed upon where the 
Knesset could enact “Basic Laws,” building a constitution, chapter by chapter, 
that ultimately could be unified.  Most of the Basic Laws would contain 
provisions to insure that they would not be altered or superseded by 
emergency resolutions, but otherwise they were not formally entrenched.403 
From 1958 to 2001 fourteen Basic Laws were adopted by the Knesset dealing 
with such matters as the Knesset, the President, the Armed Forces, and Rights 
of Human Dignity and Liberty.   
The Supreme Court of Israel is not only Israel’s highest appellate 
court, but as a court of first instance (the High Court of Justice) it may hear 
anyone with a grievance against the government.  The High Court of Justice 
has the power to issue writs of habeas corpus as well as other prerogative 
writs.  In this way, actions challenging government policy may be brought 
directly to the Court.404  
The fourteen Justices of the Supreme Court405 and the judges of lower 
courts are chosen by a nine-person committee chaired by the Minister of 
Justice.  One other member of the Cabinet, three members of the Supreme 
Court (including its President), two members of the Knesset and two members 
                                                 
402  Edelman, supra note 4, at 403, 409; Stephen Goldstein, Protection of Human 
Rights by Judges: The Israeli Experience, 38 ST. L.U.L.J. 605, 616. 
403 Martin Edelman, Judicial Review and Israel’s Struggles for a Written 
Constitution, in COMPARATIVE JUDICIAL REVIEW AND PUBLIC POLICY 
157, 158 (Donald W. Jackson & C. Neal Tate eds., 1992); Menachem Hofnung, The 
Unintended Consequences of Unplanned Constitutional Reform: Constitutional 
Politics in Israel, 44 Am.L.Comp.L. 585, 588 (1996); Martin Edelman, The Status of 
the Israeli Constitution at the present Time, SHOFAR, June 22, 2003, at 7-8, 
available at http://www.highbeam.com; Dowty, supra note 5, at 24. 
404  Haim S. Cohn, The First Fifty Years of the Supreme Court of Israel, 23 
J.SUP.CT.HIST.SOC’Y 3 1999); Neuer, supra note 4, at 43n.16. 
405 The Court sits in panels of three. The Supreme Court originally had six 
members, but is has not been increased to fourteen.  
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of the Israeli bar also sit on the committee.406  It has been suggested that 
during his presidency, Aharon Barak has dominated the process of selection. 
However, appointments have largely been based on merit.  Judges, attorneys 
or academics can be members of the Israeli Supreme Court.  The Justices 
have life tenure but also a fixed retirement age of seventy.407  
The status and jurisdiction of the judicial branch are not entrenched, 
although the Court is unaffected by orders made under emergency 
regulations.408 The Minister of Justice is responsible for managing the 
administration of the courts, and with the consent of the president of the Court 
chooses the director of the courts, who is accountable to the Minister.409 A 
permanent parliamentary committee determines judicial salaries and 
pensions.410   
Thus, to protect the rule of law, the Israeli political elite insulated the 
judiciary from the political environment.  The courts have throughout the 
history of Israel retained great public support and legitimacy as independent, 
objective, and impartial.  They have been seen as a fundamental barrier 
against partisan decisions and as the guardians of fundamental values 
embedded in the rule of law.  Nevertheless, public criticism of the courts has 
increased since the early 1990s.411 
 
 
 
                                                 
406 The actual appointment is made by Israel’s largely ceremonial President. 
407  Ina Friedman, Court of Controversy, JERUSALEM RPT, Jan. 23, 2006, at 
12, 16. 
408 Shimon Shetreet, The Critical Challenge of Judicial Independence in Israel, 
in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN THE AGE OF DEMOCRACY: CRITICAL 
PERSPECTIVES FROM AROUND THE WORLD 233, 245-46 (Peter H. Russell & 
David. M. O’Brien eds.,2001) 
409  Id., at   247. 
410  Cohn, supra note 9, at 5ff; Martin Edelman, The Changing Role of the Israeli 
Supreme Court, in COMPARATIVE JUDICIAL SYSTEMS 93, 99 (John R. 
Schmidhauser ed., 1987). 
411  Edelman, supra note 4, at  406, 412; Shetreet, supra note 13, at 239; Edelman 
supra note 8, at 161. 
     Paradoxically, the Justices have often been used to head or be part of 
commissions of inquiry into major public controversies on matters of the highest 
national importance. Justice Kahan led the inquiry into the Phalangist massacre of 
Palestinian refugees in Beirut. Judge Barak himself was a member of that 
commission. Supreme Court President Shimon Agranat headed a commission 
investigating responsibility for unprepared ness for the Yom Kippur War, which led 
to the resignations of Prime Minister Golda Meier and Defense Minister Moshe 
Dayan. Edelman, supra note 15, at 97; Shetreet, supra note 13, at 238. 
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The Israel Supreme Court, 1948-1978 
 
At the time of independence, Israel inherited the British legal system 
for the Palestine mandate; a system devoid of express legal guarantees of 
political and civil liberties and rife with emergency regulations permitting the 
suspension of rights.412 Yet, Israel also inherited from Great Britain the 
principle of government under law.  In its early years, the Israeli Supreme 
Court was concerned with establishing its authority.  Thus, the Court tended 
to avoid direct confrontations with the political branches by deferring to the 
Knesset, government, and Israeli defense forces.  Even then the government 
blatantly defied court orders and the Knesset often overruled the Court.  
Nevertheless, the Court gradually established standards for the rule of law.  
The Israeli Supreme Court was able to intervene in sensitive political 
matters by employing the powers of statutory interpretation and 
administrative review.  Laws and administrative practices were interpreted 
through a prism of human rights.  The Court started with the premise that, 
when legislating in any given area, the legislature had not harbored any 
intention to deviate from basic individual rights, unless it had done so 
explicitly and specifically.  Legislation was also read in light of super-
statutory principles, i.e., the Proclamation of Independence, principles of 
democratic government and the rules of natural justice.  Violations were 
permissible only if explicitly authorized by law.  
Where executive actions were concerned, the Court presumed that no 
government official would act against an individual unless the official had 
been clearly empowered to do so.  Legislation delegating power to ministries 
was not interpreted as delegating the power to enact restrictions on individual 
liberty.  Despite the absence of explicit statutory authorization, the Court was 
willing and able to discern, infer or interpret protection of individual rights 
within the law, and able to develop a conception of law based on a theory of 
rights.413   
It would take roughly a generation for the Israeli Supreme Court to 
conclude that universally recognized basic human rights were part and parcel 
of the Israeli legal system.  The Court expanded its conception of the rule of 
law, and asserted the right to interpret legislation in the light of principles of 
                                                 
412 PNINA LAHAV, JUDGMENT IN JERUSALEM: CHIEF JUSTICE 
AGRANAT AND THE ZIONIST CENTURY 92 (1997). 
413 Menachem Hofnung, supra note 8, at 580, 590, 597; Gavison, supra note 4, at 
12;   Edelman, supra note 4, at 410; Never, supra note , at 13; LEHAV, supra note 17, 
at 96ff.; Amos Shapira, The Genesis and Impact of Rights Protection under Israel’s 
Basic Law, 6 TOURO INT’L L.REV. 38-39; Martin Edelman, Human Rights in the 
Israeli Court Systems, Paper delivered at the 1980 Ann. Mtg ,.AM.POL.SCI.ASS’N 
at p. 5..    
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natural justice.  By applying the doctrine of reasonableness, the Court evolved 
from an organ whose function was to ensure that administrative bodies act 
within their own jurisdiction into a court that applied substantive review of 
the contents of administrative actions and policies.414 By 1974, it was clear 
that the Court’s concern for the rule of law was being extended to protect 
human rights.  In this way, the Israeli Supreme Court came to play an 
important role in establishing Israel’s commitment to a liberal political culture 
of universal, equal civil rights and liberties.415 
 
Aharon Barak 
 
Aharon Barak was born in Kouno, Lithuania in 1936.  Most of his 
family was murdered in the Holocaust, but Barak and his parents survived the 
Nazi occupation.  After his father was released from Soviet prison,416 the 
family fled on coal trains and arrived in Israel in 1947.  Barak earned his first 
degree in law from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem at the age of twenty-
two and his doctorate at twenty-seven.  A tenured professor at thirty-two, 
Barak was appointed Dean of the law faculty of the Hebrew University in 
1975.  An important scholar, Barak is the author of ten books including five 
volumes covering the interpretation of legal documents from constitutions and 
statutes to contracts and wills.417  
In 1975, Barak was also appointed Israel’s Attorney General.  In that 
office he prosecuted senior political figures including Leah Rabin, the wife of 
Yitzhak Rabin, and served as a member of the Israeli negotiating team at 
Camp David in 1978, where he acted as legal advisor, drafter and go-between.  
The same year he was named to the Supreme Court.  He became its Deputy 
President in 1993 and President in 1995.418 
As President of the Supreme Court, Barak has been a dominant force.  
He is not only the intellectual leader of the court, he also exercises leadership 
through the appointment and assignment process.419 For Barak, the role of the 
judge is to protect freely the rule of law in a democratic society by ensuring 
                                                 
414  Hofnung, supra note 8, at 601. See also Edelman, supra note 4, at 410.  
415  Shapira, supra note 18, at 38-9; Edelman, supra note 4, at 410. 
416  His father had been accused of being a Zionist. 
417  Barak, PURPOSIVE INTERPRETATION OF THE LAW (2005). See also 
Barak, JUDICIAL DISCRETION (1989). 
418  Hillel Neuer Aharon Barak’s Revolution, AZURE, (1998) No. 3 at 14-15; 
Emily Bazelon, Let there be Law, LEGAL AFF, May-June 2002, at 26-27; Aharon 
Barak, The Role of the Judge in a Democracy, JUSTICE IN THE WORLD 
MAGAZINE NO. 3, available at  http://justiceintheworld.org/n14/cover.shtml.  
419  Emily Bazelon, supra note at 6; Jonathan Rosenblum, “A Court of One”, 
Jerusalem Post, Oct. 15, 1999. 
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the accessibility of courts, demanding that legislation be clear and by keeping 
the actions of the government under judicial scrutiny.420  As a judge, Barak 
has consistently and successfully challenged traditional doctrines limiting the 
court’s power.  He has developed a judicial philosophy which assumes that 
anyone seeking a judicial decision on an issue that involves a substantive 
violation of the law or a decision in a matter which the Court considers to be 
in the “public interest,” deserves standing and, ordinarily, a decision on the 
merits.  Thus, he has successfully encouraged the court’s intervention in an 
ever-growing range of cases.421 
 
THE JUDGE IN A DEMOCRACY 
 
The Judge in a Democracy is a book by a judge about judging, and 
more particularly about judging in a democracy during an era in which human 
rights are “the core of substantive democracy.”  Democracies are facing the 
emerging threat of terrorism and the importance of the judiciary relative to the 
other branches has increased.422  
 Barak rejects the convention that the judge merely states the law and 
does not create it as a “fiction, even a childish approach.”  In the “hard cases,” 
judges exercise judicial discretion among a number of legitimate options.423 
Barak is concerned with formulating a systematic and principled approach to 
the exercise of discretion by judges.  He devotes the first part of his book to 
discussing the two central elements of the judicial role that go beyond actually 
deciding a dispute.  The first element is bridging the gap between law and 
society as a partner in creating the law with the legislature.  Barak sees the 
responsibility of the law to be responsive to change in society.  The other 
element is protecting the constitution and substantive democracy as expressed 
in the concept of separation of powers, the rule of law, fundamental 
principles, the independence of the judiciary, and human rights.424   
The second part of Barak’s book contains two of the chapters that 
Americans may find the most thought provoking, i.e., those on non-
justiciability and standing.  In this section Barak also explores the means by 
which a court can fulfill its role.  He touches upon public confidence, 
common law decision-making, and constitutional and statutory interpretation.   
Barak also introduces his philosophy of “purposive interpretation,” a method 
to realize the purpose the legal text serves.  Purposive interpretation is the 
                                                 
420  Neuer, supra note 4, at 18. 
421  Neuer, supra note 4, at 14. 
422  AHARON BARAK, THE JUDGE IN A DEMOCRACY xi-xiv. (2006). 
423  Id. at xiv, 119 
424  Id. at xviii 
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relationship between the objective purpose (hypothetical intent that a 
reasonable author would want to realize) and the subjective purpose (real 
intent of the author).425 Barak next looks to balancing and weighing as a 
judicial tool and finally at the significance of comparative law.426 He holds 
comparative law to be of great assistance in judging and expanding a judge’s 
horizons and interpretive fields of vision.  Comparative law helps 
understanding of judicial interpretation’s place and the role of the judge as an 
interpreter by illuminating those instances where democracy infringes on 
fundamental values, and it also presents alternatives in considering 
solutions.427  
In the third section of the book, Barak discusses the relationship in a 
democracy between the court and the political branches.  Tension between the 
courts and the political branches is natural and desirable according to Barak.  
If the court’s rulings were always satisfactory to the other branches, it would 
raise the suspicion that the court was not properly filling its role in a 
democracy.428 Barak distinguishes between: (1) societies that regard the state 
with great suspicion, such as the United States, (2) societies where the state 
represented by the legislature and the executive is a realization of national 
aspiration, and (3) societies where the state is viewed as both a source of good 
and evil, within which the law is made up of positive and negative rights of 
government.  This last group includes Canada and Israel.  
  In this section Barak also includes discussions of judicial review of 
legislation and of non-legislative decisions of the legislature, as well as 
reasonableness and proportionality as judicial tools.  Barak discusses the need 
for constant dialogue between the judiciary and the legislature, which occurs 
when each branch carries out its institutional role.  He supports the Canadian 
and Israeli legal systems, which permit the legislature to overrule a Supreme 
Court decision voiding a statute and allow the legislature to pass a new statute 
when the courts interpret a statute in a manner that is unacceptable to the 
legislature.429  
In the fourth part of the book, Barak evaluates the role of the judge in 
a democracy, evaluates judicial activism and judicial self-restraint, and looks 
specifically at judging in an age of terrorism.  For Barak, the role of the 
activist and the self-restrained judge relates to how well the judge realizes 
his/her role of bridging the gap between law and society’s changing reality of 
                                                 
425  Id. at 125.  In PURPOSIVE INTERPRETATION IN LAW (2005), Barak has 
applied purposive interpretation to the interpretation of all legal texts from contracts 
and wills to constitutions. 
426  Id. at 201. In the chapter on judgments, Barak considers the judgment’s level 
427  Id. at 194-97. 
428  Id.  at 216. 
429  Id.  at 237. 
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protecting the constitution and its values.  Barak refuses to classify himself as 
judicially restrained or judicially active, stating that he favors graduated 
change in law, i.e., change in accordance with the “general framework of the 
system, normative coherence, organic growth, natural development, 
continuity and consistency.”430 A judge, he concludes, “can best bridge the 
gap between law and society by exercising partial activism and partial 
restraint.”431   
The last part of the last section of the book concludes with a chapter 
on the role of the judge in theory, in reality as well as in the future.  Barak 
states that in creating new law, the judge should first bridge the gap between 
social reality and the law,432 and second, protect the constitution and its 
values. Barak believes that a judge should try to develop a judicial philosophy 
rather than act intuitively.433 For Barak, that philosophy is purposive 
interpretation.  In the future, change, both technological and social, will occur 
even more rapidly than before and legislatures will not always be able to keep 
pace with these changes.  Thus, society will need more than ever its courts to 
bridge the gaps between law and life.434 Democracy, Barak says, needs strong 
courts especially when it has a strong legislature and executive.435  Barak 
concludes by denying that he has a political platform.  He emphasizes the 
“chains” that bind him as a judge and as the President of the Supreme Court, 
and writes of judging as a mission.  It is not a job; It is a way of life.  
  
Barak on Justiciability, Standing and the Judicial Role and Terrorism 
 
While The Judge in a Democracy predominantly outlines the role of a 
judge within a structure familiar to most Americans, three chapters, i.e., those 
on justiciability, standing and the judicial role, and the problem of terrorism 
will be found particularly provocative, for their approach is quite different 
from the practice in the United States. 
  For Barak, the separation of powers is the backbone of the 
constitution.436 The three branches of government are of equal status, each 
having its own unique character.  However, Barak has little patience for the 
“political question” doctrine.  He begins with the view that the “law is 
everywhere.”437 Whereas Barak may examine a decision on its merits or may 
                                                 
430  Id. at 281. 
431  Id. 
432  Id. at 306-07. 
433  Id. at 308. 
434  Id. at 310-11. 
435  Id. at 312. 
436  Id. at 35. 
437  Id. at 179. 
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ultimately abstain from making a decision for lack of a cause of action,438 he 
does not believe that a court should abdicate its role in a democracy merely 
because it is uncomfortable or fears tension with other branches of the state. 
For Barak, refusal of the Court to judge an issue is “political thinking which is 
inappropriate for a court.”439Each branch is authorized and obligated to 
interpret the scope of its own authority.  However, when a dispute arises as to 
the legality of that interpretation, the formal decision is in the hands of the 
judiciary.440  Barak does not, however, add much to the traditional arguments 
that political non-accountability, professional training, and independence 
make the judiciary the most qualified to decide such disputes.  “More than 
any branch, judges can be trusted to adjudicate objectively and 
appropriately.”441  
Where the separation of powers is concerned, the role of the judge in 
a legal system whose values are democratic is “to preserve and protect the 
separation of powers.”442 In contrast to the federal courts in the United States, 
Barak believes the judiciary should act when coordinate branches acts 
unlawfully.  In the United States, the federal courts will not void a pardon 
given for improper motives, overturn defects in Senate impeachment 
procedures, or reverse the President’s action where he would not dismiss a 
Secretary of State facing criminal proceedings.  In contrast, for Barak, the 
situations in which the courts refrain from exercising their jurisdiction would 
be rare and exceptional. 443  
Barak discusses both normative justiciability, i.e., whether there are 
legal criteria to resolve a dispute, and institutional justiciability, which 
focuses on whether it is desirable to decide a dispute that is normatively 
justiciable.444 Institutional justiciability for Barak seems to have no 
independent existence.445 Barak rejects the view that some cases contain a 
lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for their 
resolution.446 Every legal problem, he says, “is encompassed in the world of 
                                                 
438  Id. at 177. 
439  Neuer, supra note 4, at 19ff. 
440  BARAK, supra note 27, at 42.  
441  Id. at 44. 
442  Id. at 45. 
443  Id. at 49-50. 
444  Id.at 178ff. See also Id. at 183. 
445  H.C. 910/86 Ressler v. Minister of Defense, 42 P.D. 441, available at 
www.court.gov.il 
446  See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). 
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law.”447 Barak has even argued in dicta that issues regarding war and peace 
may be justiciable.448  
 For Barak that does not mean that legal solutions are always the best 
solutions.  The mere fact that an issue is political, i.e., it has political 
ramifications and predominantly political elements, “does not mean that it 
cannot be resolved by a court.”449 That a certain matter is entrusted 
exclusively to one branch is not a permit for that branch to act unlawfully 
within the framework of that authority, nor does it mean that the question of 
the legality of that act is also entrusted to that branch of state.  Political 
authorities are free to act within but not without the law.450  The solution for 
Barak, therefore, may often be that the Court decides the case on the merits, 
but holds that the government has acted within a zone of reasonableness.  He 
has, for example, taken the position that the issue of whether the government 
could release a terrorist within the framework of a political “package deal” 
was justiciable, but that the legal criteria to resolve the matter fell within the 
discretion of the executive.451 
Barak disagrees with the view that there are disputes that are 
impossible to resolve judicially without expressing respect for 
coordinate branches of the state.  He says that “[I]t is 
inconceivable that preferring the judicial interpretation to the 
interpretation of the other branch expresses disrespect for that 
branch.  There is no disrespect to the other branches when each 
branch fulfills its constitutional role and does what the law has 
ordered it to do.”452 Barak also disputes the view that recognition 
of institutional non-justiciability is implicit in the concept of 
democracy itself.453  
Finally, Barak is unwilling to be swayed by the fact that institutional 
non-justiciability is justified, because it protects the court itself from a 
“politicization of the judiciary” that could undermine the confidence of the 
public in the courts.  The role of the court”, he says, “is to adjudicate disputes 
even if the public or some portion of it does not like the outcome.”454 No one 
                                                 
447  Barak, supra note 27, at 179. 
448  H.C. 910/86, Ressler v. Minister of Defense, 42(2) P.D. 441 available at 
www.court.gov.il. 
449  Id. at 179. 
450  Id. 
451 H.C.6315/97, Federman v. Prime Minister (unreported). See Barak, supra note 
27, at 180 n.12. 
452  H.C. 73/85 “Kach” Faction v. Chairman of Knesset, 39 (3) P.D. 141, 163. See 
Barak, supra note 27, at 184-85. 
453  See Barak, supra note 27, at 185. 
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can fault the Israeli Supreme Court of the last twenty-five years for timidity.  
The Court has been repeatedly willing to examine the internal decisions of the 
Knesset.455 It went to the merits and ruled that expropriating land in an area 
under Israeli military occupation for the purpose of establishing a settlement 
was unlawful.456 It has ruled on the validity of a pardon granted by the 
President of the State to the Israeli General Security Service and to a number 
of its agents for illegal acts they had committed.457 It has held that methods of 
interrogation employed against terrorists, such as sleep deprivation, head 
covering, and painful sitting positions, were illegal even if used to prevent the 
“explosion of a ticking bomb.”458 Thus, it may not be surprising that Barak 
praises the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision to go to the merits in Bush v. 
Gore.459 
The political question doctrine in American law is “confusing and 
unsatisfactory,” and an area which has not profited by judicial consistency.460 
It is now  limited to the Republican Form of Government Clause of Article 
Four, with cases involving activities of political parties, foreign affairs issues, 
Congress’s ability to regulate its internal processes, the process for ratifying 
constitutional amendments, the impeachment process, and instances where a 
federal court cannot shape equitable relief and American judges with cases in 
some of these areas might profit by consideration of Barak’s approach, even 
though Israeli judges are advantaged by the fact that they need not be 
constrained about exercising undemocratic authority, because in the absence 
of a comprehensive, written constitution, their decisions can in some areas be 
overridden by a legislative majority.461 
 
STANDING 
 
On and off the bench, Barak has been a strong advocate of very 
liberal approaches to standing.  Barak’s audaciousness takes him far beyond 
American judges, who are somewhat limited by Article III of the U.S. 
Constitution.  Barak regards his role as a judge not merely as a dispute-settler, 
but also as one responsible for “bridging the gap between law and society and 
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protecting …democracy.”  Such a judge will tend to expand the rules of 
standing and release judges from the requirement of an injury in fact.  For 
Barak and his Court, virtually everyone has standing to challenge the legality 
of a civil servant’s behavior.  Barak’s court has adopted the view that when a 
claim alleges a major violation of the rule of law in its broad sense, every 
person in Israel has legal standing to sue.462 
Barak sees the connection between the rules of standing and the 
principle of the rule of law.  Closing the doors of the court to a petitioner with 
no injury in fact, who is complaining about an unlawful action of a public 
body, means giving that public body a free hand to act without fear of judicial 
review.463 Barak seconds the observations of Lord Diplock that, “it would in 
my view, be a grave lacuna in our system of public law if a pressure 
group…or even a single public-spirited taxpayer, were prevented by outdated 
rules of locus standi from bringing the matter to the attention of the court to 
vindicate the rule of law and get the unlawful conduct stopped.”464 In the end, 
Barak takes “issue with a standing doctrine under which someone who claims 
that a public body unlawfully took his private money can resort to the courts, 
but someone who claims that a public body unlawfully took public money 
cannot.”465   
In its role as the High Court of Justice, the Israel Supreme Court 
reviewed public petitions raising such issues as: (1) whether the Attorney 
General exercised his discretion properly in deciding not to indict someone,466 
(2) whether the government held political negotiations over a peace 
agreement at a time when it did not have the confidence of Parliament,467 and 
(3) whether a parole board acted lawfully when it reduced a sentence imposed 
by a civil court.468  
If Article III of the American Constitution makes such an approach to 
standing at times difficult and sometimes impossible, one still may regret 
some of the lost opportunities to bring public authorities to account.  
However, where the concern is not Article III but rather concern about 
flooded dockets, it should be noted that the Israel Supreme Court has been 
successful in balancing the importance of recognizing public petitions as 
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safeguards for the rule of law and the fear of overburdening the court with 
petitions.469 
 
The Israeli Judiciary and Terrorism 
 
American civil libertarians should envy the performance of the Israeli 
Supreme Court as a protector of human rights in the occupied territories.  
Terrorism creates tensions affecting the balance between majority rule and the 
protection of individual rights.  Barak’s position is that it is the judge’s role to 
protect democracy from terrorism as well as from the means the state wants to 
use to fight terrorism.470  
In stark contract to the performance of most of the American judges, 
trial and appellate, who have handled terrorism cases, Barak takes the position 
that the protection of every individual’s human rights is much more important 
during times of terrorism than in times of peace.  Barak simply does not 
accept the view, quaintly expressed in translation, that “when the cannons 
speak, the Muses are silent.”471 He insists that it is unacceptable for the law to 
be silent during battle.  The struggle against terrorism should not be 
conducted outside the law, but, rather, within the law.  Barak does not agree 
with Chief Justice William Rehnquist that such questions should be deferred 
until the fight against terror is over.  If so, he says, the protection of human 
rights would be bankrupt.472 Barak states, “I must take human rights seriously 
during times of peace and conflict.  I must not make do with the mistaken 
belief that, at the end of the conflict, I can turn back the clock.”473 It is in times 
of terrorism when public opinion is most likely to favor actions that seem to 
promote security that judicial independence is most necessary.474 Barak 
reminds us “the test of the rule of law arises not merely in the few cases 
brought before the court, but also in the many potential cases that are not 
brought before it.”475 
Palestinians who live in the occupied areas have access to the Israel’s 
High Court.  If earlier in his judicial career Barak signed his share of orders 
approving exiles, demolition of houses, detention, torture, and land seizures, 
in later years he has led the trend towards increased judicial review of the 
State’s advancement of security considerations.476 In 1988, in the Schnitzler 
                                                 
469  Shetreet, supra note 13, at 233, 237. 
470  Barak, supra note 27, at 285. 
79 Id. at 287. 
472  Id. at 299. 
473  Id. at 285. 
474  Id. at 286. 
475  Id.at 304. 
476  Bazelon, supra note 6, at 30-31. 
2007] BOOK REVIEWS       193 
 
 
case, Barak wrote for the three-justice panel that overturned a decision by the 
military censor banning publication in a Tel Aviv newspaper of selections 
from an article about the Mossad.477 In 1998 Barak convened a special nine-
justice panel to hear six new petitions involving allegations of torture.  
Thereby, he signaled discomfort with the government’s reliance on the 
defense of necessity.  In September 1999, he wrote for a unanimous court that 
held the methods of interrogation Shin Bet (one of Israel’s secret services) 
employed against Palestinians detained without charges violated the right to 
human dignity and freedom.  The Court announced that it would no longer 
defer to the government when individual rights were concerned, even if that 
meant putting Israelis at risk, unless the Knesset could legalize torture as 
comported with the Basic Law.478 The Court has also ordered the government 
to change the route of the barrier separating Israel from Palestinian territory 
and has prohibited the army’s practice of using Palestinians as “human 
shields.”479  
Barak promotes a single system of balancing, rather than one for 
regular times and another when there is the threat of terrorism.480 To carefully 
balance national security and human rights, he prescribes that: (1) the courts 
should be open to anyone with a complaint about a public authority; ( 2) the 
courts should be available in “real time,” i.e., when the situation is presented; 
and 3) the courts should not reflexively rely on national security rationales.  
Security considerations, he says, “are not magic words, nor can they be 
‘pretextual’.”481 Instead, there should be specific consideration with the 
specific solution least damaging to human rights.  Thus, in Israel judicial 
adjudication may come while the events being reviewed are taking place, 
even at the beginning of an interrogation.  Further, the High Court will hear 
cases even if terrorist activities occur outside Israel or the terrorists are being 
detained outside Israel.482  
Barak argues that any balance that is struck between security and 
freedom will impose certain limitations on both.  Such a balance will not be 
achieved when human rights are fully protected, nor when national security is 
afforded full protection.483 Barak concludes, “[j]udicial review of the legality 
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of the battle on terrorism may make the battle harder in the short term, but it 
also fortifies and strengthens the people in the long term.”484  
 
The Constitutionalization of Israeli Law by the Barak Court 
 
It may be helpful to set Barak’s book against the jurisprudence of the 
Israeli Supreme Court during Barak’s tenure as President of the Court.  
During this time, with much criticism, Barak has declared a “constitutional 
revolution.”485 This constitutional revolution fit smoothly with Barak’s 
judicial philosophy.  According to Barak, “if up until now judges were given 
“conventional weapons” to deal with legislation by way of interpretation and 
the creation of Israeli common law, not judges have been given “non-
conventional” weapons.”486 
The development of a constitution began with Chief Justice Moshe 
Landau’s decision in Bergman v. Minister of Finance almost a decade before 
Barak’s appointment.487 In that case, the Supreme Court for the first time 
declared an act of the Knesset void for violating a Basic Law.  The Court held 
that a campaign financing law had not been adopted by the special majority of 
the Knesset as required in the Basic Law: The Knesset.  Furthermore, the law 
unfairly discriminated against new political parties, thus violating the equality 
of all before the law.  Thus, the Court acted on the unarticulated premise that 
Section 4 of the Basic Law: The Knesset provided the catalyst for Israel 
accepting the principle that it ought to be governed within the parameters set 
out by a written constitution authoritatively interpreted by its highest court.488  
In December 1975, the government introduced the Basic Law: 
Legislation and announced that all Basic Laws in existence and those later 
enacted were to be treated as superior to other Knesset legislation.  However, 
the proposal was not adopted because of controversies over enactment of a 
Bill of Rights as well as disagreements over entrenchment and the supremacy 
of the Knesset.489   
In 1979, a year after Barak was appointed to the Court, the tribunal 
began in the Elon Moreh case to apply more substantive criteria in reviewing 
administrative decisions.  The case involved an order dismantling a West 
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Bank settlement within thirty days and restoring land to its lawful owners, 
who were Arabs.  The Court held that security considerations were subject to 
substantive review even when the authorities were operating within their 
power.  The Court looked behind the national security argument and found it 
wanting.490   
During the 1980s and early 1990s, when the political branches were 
in a  stalemate, the Court took on an increasingly activist role.  Among its 
decisions was one that ended censorship of the theater.  Another 
acknowledged the right of newspaper reporters to refrain from disclosure of 
their sources.  The Court also ordered the military to distribute gas masks to 
Palestinian residents in the occupied territory during the Gulf War and forced 
a judge of the High Rabbinical Court who had become the spiritual leader of a 
political party to retire from his judicial post.491  
During this period, the Court did not hesitate to intrude into the 
operation of the other branches of government.  It decided cases involving 
internal matters of the Knesset, such as the Speaker’s interpretation of a 
Knesset bylaw.492 The Court decided a case determining the power of the 
minister of justice to refuse to surrender a criminal fugitive declared 
extraditable by the courts.493 The Court ruled that Prime Minister Yitzhak 
Rabin had to fire Interior Minister Aryeh Deri, who had been indicted for a 
crime, even though the Knesset had prescribed in a statute that a minister 
must resign when convicted of a crime.494 It also held unreasonable the 
nomination of Yossef Ginossar, who had admitted to illegal actions and 
received a pardon before any charges were brought, to be Director General of 
the Housing Ministry.495 By 1992, there were few areas of public life beyond 
the reach of court review.496  
 
The Barak Court from 1992 to Date 
 
As of 1992, observers had no trouble agreeing that Israel did not have 
a constitution, and that the sovereignty of the Knesset was almost unlimited.  
The Supreme Court would only invalidate legislation when it conflicted with 
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a specifically entrenched clause of a Basic Law or when the majority had not 
enacted a law specified by a clause in a Basic Law.497  
In March 1992, with few members voting, the Knesset adopted two 
Basic Laws, one on Freedom of Occupation and the other on Human Dignity 
and Liberty.498  Section 5 of the Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation stated 
that it might not be changed “except by a basic law enacted by the majority of 
the Knesset,” thus entrenching that whole Basic Law.  That Basic Law also 
provided a standard for the Knesset to live up to when limiting the rights 
stated in the Basic Law, a standard implying judicial review.  The Basic Law 
Freedom of Occupation provided in Section 5 that the Knesset could pass 
legislation that violated rights set out in the Basic Law, so long as such laws 
suited Israel’s values, pursued a proper purpose, and violated the right to an 
extent no greater than required.   
While the Knesset did not clearly establish the superiority of the 
Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty over ordinary legislation nor 
specifically give the courts authority to determine the constitutionality of 
legislation that possibly conflicted with it, it provided in Section 8 that the 
Basic Law shall not be infringed except by a statute that  befits the values of 
the State of Israel as a “Jewish and democratic state” and is directed towards a 
worthy purpose, and then only to an extent that it does not exceed what is 
necessary.  Such a standard implied judicial review.499 
 
Barak greeted the new order gleefully: “Every branch of the law and 
every legal norm will have to adapt itself to the Constitutional rule,” he 
said.500 In 1994, the Court found that the Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation 
had been infringed by the practice of prohibiting wholesale importation of 
non-Kosher meat and struck down the law.  The Knesset then overturned the 
decision by an override and an explicit law.501  
The following year, the Court held in the Bank Mizrachi case that the 
Knesset had the authority to frame the Constitution and had done so in the 
1992 Basic Laws.  In the 139 page opinion, the Court with nine justices sitting 
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held that it had the power to declare unconstitutional laws that do not comply 
with the standards of the Basic Law.502  The Knesset acknowledged that 
power by amending the Basic Law to allow for modifications by ordinary 
laws if an absolute majority of the Knesset supported their passage.  Thus, the 
power of the Israeli Supreme Court had been expanded dramatically to 
include the ability to strike down legislation, which in its opinion violated 
normative rights.503  
While the Supreme Court has only wielded its power to strike down 
statutes twice since the Bank Mizrachi case, the existence of such an activist 
court serves as a check on the range of options considered by the Knesset.504 
More important may be the long series of basic rights that the Court has since 
recognized as having constitutional dimension, including rights such as 
freedom of expression, journalism, and demonstrations; the right to equality 
and non-discrimination; freedom to pursue one’s own life plan; freedom from 
state intrusion into one’s physical and mental privacy, and the right to an 
education.  The Court has even recognized social and economic rights.505  
 
Criticisms of the Barak Court 
 
The Court has given some of the Basic Laws constitutional status and 
assumed the supreme authority to interpret them.  With its great expansion of 
its role as a policy-maker, the Court has somewhat injured its legitimacy.  Its 
security decisions have been unpopular, and as a result of other decisions, it 
has become identified with the secular-liberal segment of Israeli society.506 
Critics of the Court point out that “The decision to confer supremacy on the 
court was never made by any popular organ [but] [i]t has been made by 
judges, conferring power on the judges and placing that power beyond the 
reach of both legislation and constitutional amendment itself.”507 In May 
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2003, Knesset Speaker Reuven Rivlin charged that Israel had been the victim 
of a constitutional putsch.508  
In many ways, Israeli criticism of the Barak Court has been 
reminiscent of the criticism of the Warren Court in the United States.  The 
Court has been criticized for acting as “the supreme moral arbiter of 
society.”509  It has been accused of “usurping the legislature’s role…making 
democratic politics…largely irrelevant.”510 It has been further argued that 
“[r]ather than allowing the political process to handle problems through 
consensus building and compromises, the current system encourages the 
reduction of value-laden to technical questions, to be resolved by 
adjudication.”511   
The Court has also been criticized for taking sides, for drawing upon 
“the majestic generalities” of the new Basic Laws, and for reflecting the 
values of an “enlightened community” just like them, which is comfortable 
with individual autonomy and human rights.512 Ruth Gavison states that it is 
wrong for the court to make use of its power to “decide in favor of 
Westernism and against traditionalism; or in favor of modernity and 
individualism and against communitarianism.”513 A more extreme critic has 
paired Barak with Ariel Sharon as having a hidden agenda “to emasculate 
Jews and erase Israel’s Jewish character.”514   
The Court has lost support among Jewish nationalists, the Orthodoxy, 
and security maximalists.515 The backlash against the Court has led to large 
demonstrations.  It has also led to proposals to increase the number of justices 
as well as to an attempt to deprive the Supreme Court of much of its 
jurisdiction by creating a new “constitutional court.”  Barak responded by 
calling the proposed constitutional court “a cockroach.”516 
 
Conclusions 
 
 Within months, Aharon Barak will retire from the Israel Supreme 
Court after a twenty-eight year tenure, thirteen as its President.  At a time it is 
under attack, the Court will sustain the loss of a commanding presence and 
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towering intellect who has polished political skills.  In addition, Barak’s seat 
is only one of several that will need filling.  The Minister of Justice has 
postponed convening the committee that appoints Justices, because she 
believes it is stacked against the appointment of Ruth Gavison, a towering 
intellect who objects to Barak’s views on judicial review, justiciability, and 
much else.517  
Heretofore, the Court has been protected from serious damage.  
Successive governments of Israel have accepted the constraints placed on 
them by the Court, apparently because of the net benefit they receive from 
decisions conferring legitimacy upon them.518 The Court has used its wiles 
and rendered judgments that have avoided confrontation by postponing 
operative orders.519 And, in spite of the growth of criticism, public opinion 
remains behind the Court, based upon a belief that security from arbitrary 
governmental coercion is based upon a strict adherence to the rule of law.520 
Even Ruth Gavison says, “Our Supreme Court is very impressive.  All told, it 
has excellent people, it enjoys a very strong status at home and high 
professional prestige.  We can all take pride in it.”521   
Into the mix at this time, however, are thrown the variety of efforts 
going forward to create a constitution for Israel;  the effects of the recent 
election; the continued divisions between the Orthodox and non-Orthodox 
over the role of Jewish law; and the atrophying of the power of the Ashkenazi 
elite.  The Ashkenazi still control the instruments of the law, but they are a 
beleaguered minority. 522  
Americans reading this book, a book of a remarkable judge’s 
philosophy of the role of the judicial branch, should be aware of the central 
role the author has played in Israeli constitutionalism.  Many Americans may 
be wary of Barak’s expanded view of standing, abhor his disregard of the 
concept of non-justiciability, and fear the restrictions on the government even 
during times of terrorism.  What Barak prescribes for the role of the judge in a 
democracy may not inevitably lead to a profound accumulation of judicial 
power.  Instead, they are merely checks on the other branches of government, 
ensuring that the fundamental values and principles that democratic societies 
hold to such high regard are in fact promoted.  While changes in an 
established political system have the potential to cause a sense of instability,  
                                                 
517  Friedman, supra note 12, at 12-13. 
518  Gavison, supra note 4, at 18, n. 56. 
519  Shetreet, supra note 13, at 241. 
520  Edelman, supra note 4, at  406. 
521  Shavit, supra note 115, at 5-6. 
522  Shavit, supra note 115, at 5-6; Friedman, supra note 12, at 16. 
200 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF LEGAL INFORMATION [Vol. 35.1 
 
 
fear, and criticism, from Barak’s point of view “this modern development is 
not to increase the power of the court in a democracy but rather to increase the 
protection of democracy and human rights.”131 
 
Jeffrey B. Morris and Shari G. Newman523 
 
 
A Jury of Whose Peers? The Cultural Politics of Juries in Australia.  Edited 
by Kate Auty and Sandy Toussaint.  Crawley, Western Australia: University 
of Western Australia Press, 2004.  Pp. ix, 174.  ISBN 1-920694-17-X.  
US$35.00 
 
 If the criminal courtroom were a stage (as indeed it so often has been 
in pop culture), who would be the stars?  The jury, according to Kate Auty 
and Sandy Toussaint, editors of A Jury of Whose Peers?, a collection of seven 
essays written by contributors running the gamut from academic to the 
“average Joe.”  The collection, which is subtitled The Cultural Politics of 
Juries in Australia, puts the jury center stage in an attempt to examine the 
culture of the courtroom as it is both created by and imposed upon the jury as 
a discreet social body. 
 Auty and Touissant, a magistrate and an anthropologist respectively, 
aim to place legal studies within the framework of “cultural studies.”  The 
goal is an interesting and an important one, but here, the editors have 
sacrificed depth for breadth.  The entire book, including notes and index, is a 
slim 174 pages, only 122 of which are substantive text.  In that short space, 
seven authors cover such diverse topics as the emotional and practical 
demands placed on jurors (chapter one) and barristers (chapter two), juror 
competence (chapter three), the inequality of Australian aborigines (chapters 
four and five) and battered woman syndrome (chapters six and seven).   
 The tones of the various chapters are also uneven, ranging from 
humorous to passionate to academic.  Indeed, the editors did this 
intentionally, arguing that the shifting voices reflect the complexity and 
ambiguity of the discussion.  As a result, one of the central functions of 
editing a collection - bringing together a multiplicity of perspectives around a 
core theme to create a diverse yet coherent reading experience - is ignored.  
Here, the only commonality between the essays is that they each mention 
juries, but even that connection is tenuous.  For example, the last two essays 
on battered woman syndrome are chiefly critical of the way abused women 
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are handled by the judicial system as a whole and barely mention what if any 
role the jury plays in the dysfunction of that particular defense in the 
Australian legal system. 
 Yet there are a few if not gems than at least semi-precious stones in 
this collection.  Indigenous writer and film-maker Richard Frankland’s piece 
is a poignant personal exploration of the disconnection between the ideal of a 
representative jury and the reality of continuing prejudice.  Because of the 
historical and continuing oppression of aboriginal communities in Australia, 
Frankland painfully concludes, “No jury will ever be my peers.”  Editor Kate 
Auty’s piece takes up the historical half of this equation and is a thorough and 
well-documented introduction to the legal treatment of Australian aborigines 
over the past century.  The discussions of battered woman syndrome are also 
useful, particularly Jocelyn Scutt’s piece arguing that the misuse and 
misinterpretation of the syndrome as its own defense, instead of as evidence 
in determining the reasonableness element of ordinary self-defense harms, 
abused women more than it helps them. 
 A Jury of Whose Peers? is well-edited and well-documented with 
extensive citations for each chapter.  It includes an excellent bibliography as 
well as tables of other referenced sources such as archives, crown files and 
government publications.  It also includes a table of cases cited; however, the 
usefulness of this feature is diminished by a lack of page number references.  
Finally, it has a sparse index that, though not put together as carefully as one 
would hope (novelist Toni Morrison who appears in two footnotes has her 
own entry whereas criminal defendant Robyn Kina who was discussed 
extensively in chapter 6 is nestled mysteriously under “Communications, 
language issues”) is adequate for the book’s size. 
 Because of the spotty quality of some of the pieces in this collection, 
it is not a recommended for smaller libraries or those with limited budgets.  
However, for larger academic law libraries with significant international law 
collections the best of the pieces in this book are worth having.   
  
Tammy R. Pettinato 
University of Michigan Law Library 
Anna Arbor, MI USA 
 
 
A Theory of International Terrorism: Understanding Islamic Militancy.  By 
L. Ali Khan.  Leiden, The Netherlands: Koninklijke Brill NV, 2006.  Pp. xi, 
371.  ISBN 90-04-15207-5.  €115.00; US$150.00. 
 
L. Ali Khan is a law professor at Washburn University in Kansas.  In 
this book, Dr. Khan explains Islamic militancy using three case studies: 
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Israel/Palestine, Chechnya, and Kashmir.  Along the way, he discusses the 
role of armed jihad from a standpoint of Islamic theology, “value 
imperialism,” and how the very concept of the Nation State may undermine 
satisfactory and peaceful solutions to the conflicts under study.  Building on 
his earlier books, The Extinction of Nation States (1996) and A Theory of 
Universal Democracy (2003), he also proposes novel, long-term strategies to 
resolve other intercultural political conflicts worldwide. 
 Part I of the book, dedicated to the phenomenology of terrorism, 
describes a “terror triangle,” a schematic that shows how the Nation State, 
born of violence, uses violence for its preservation.  In the case of Chechnya, 
the Chechens are an aggrieved indigenous population and Russia is the Nation 
State that suppresses them.  The third component of the triangle comprises the 
various entities, States and non-State actors, that provide moral, financial, and 
military support to the aggrieved population.   
 Part II is dedicated to the ontology of terrorism.  Dr. Khan challenges 
the assertion, most forcefully advanced by American neo-conservatives, that 
Islam is inherently violence-prone, and that individual Muslims have been 
programmed for violence by Islamic theology.  He believes the militancy of 
the Palestinians, Chechens, and Kashmiris arises from a set of concrete 
grievances, and that militancy is in its turn continually fuelled by the State 
violence employed by Israel, Russia, and India.  He also believes the 
militancy is stoked by value imperialism promulgated by the three 
suppressive States; i.e. they attempt to impose their mores on the aggrieved 
populations, and hence do not limit themselves to strict national security or 
“law and order” agendas. 
 Dr. Khan discusses Islam’s Basic Code (the Qur’an plus the Sunnah, 
the reflections and deeds of Prophet Muhammad) as it applies to resistance to 
injustice and oppression.  He describes the different types of resistance 
allowed to observant Muslims, and thus tries to impart a moral basis to it.  He 
contrasts an essentially defensive Islamic resistance, which includes armed 
resistance, with the predatory violence employed by the three State 
adversaries.  Dr. Khan sees this State-sanctioned counter-violence as amoral 
in that it arises from base motives: economic interests, coveting territory, and 
natural resources, or merely raison d’État.  Moreover, he believes armed jihad 
is justified under the jus ad bellum doctrine in the United Nations Charter, in 
so much as the document enshrines the right to self-determination of peoples.  
It is understandable that Dr. Khan, a devout Muslim, should make a 
distinction between violence he sees as divinely sanctioned and other types of 
violence.  It is less clear why he adverts to the U.N. Charter, since that secular 
document is the product of an international legal order that has not been 
influenced by any of the five schools of Islamic jurisprudence he describes. 
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Dr. Khan sees the United States as the globe’s principal suppressive 
power, citing the country’s promiscuous use of its armed forces and its 
ongoing attempts to impose its cultural norms on recalcitrant populations 
worldwide.  Some of his critiques of the United States are reminiscent of 
those emanating from the European academic Left in the 1960s and 1970s, 
e.g., the United States is a rapacious empire in search of global hegemony.  
According to that interpretation, when the United States wasn’t incinerating 
the world’s peoples with its napalm, it was exploiting them with its 
multinational corporations, poisoning them with its fast food, and 
brainwashing them with its movies and pop music.  In Dr. Khan’s retelling, 
American foreign policy no longer seems to be in thrall to domestic capital, 
but is now a tool of Christian evangelicals and their neo-conservative allies, 
who, when not waging war on Muslims or supporting those who are, seek to 
defame them – before converting them.   
If Dr. Khan’s analysis recalls one that is both secular and Western, 
this is perhaps because he has spent much of his life in a secular West; 
although of Pakistani origin, he received much of his post-graduate education 
in the United States.  He resembles in this way the Iranian sociologist Ali 
Shariati, himself a product of the Sorbonne.  Dr. Shariati worked diligently to 
find Islamic solutions to the twin problems of (capitalist) liberalism and 
(communist) materialism, but he leavened his writings with a dash of tiers-
mondisme on the Frantz Fanon model.  (Dr. Shariati’s works helped inspire 
the overthrow of the Shah, though this did not prevent the Iranian mullahs 
from banning his books once they had assumed power.) 
In Part III of the book, Dr. Khan proposes peaceful solutions to the 
three conflicts under study, beginning with negotiated solutions.  Because he 
sees the militant groups fighting on behalf of the Palestinians, Chechens, and 
Kashmiris as rational actors, he believes negotiating with them would not be 
appeasement or a fool’s errand, but instead an equally rational act on the part 
of the three implicated States.  He adduces the Canadian federal government’s 
success in negotiating an end to separatist violence committed by the Front de 
libération du Québec in the 1960s and 1970s.  That small, armed militant 
group was brought into the political process, but Canada is a pacific country 
with long traditions of consensus-building and constitutional legality to draw 
upon.  Ottawa’s inducing the Front to forswear violence may not be readily 
transferable to other countries. 
Indeed, peaceful solutions to postwar Europe’s three protracted, 
violent separatist conflicts, in Ulster, the Basque country, and Corsica, have 
remained elusive.  Although the Irish Republican Army has, after a decade of 
negotiations with successive British and Irish governments, renounced armed 
struggle, Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (“ETA”) and the Fronte di liberazione 
naziunale di a Corsica have not, and negotiations with those groups on the 
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part of various Spanish and French governments have yielded little of 
permanence. 
Moving to less politically mature countries, the results are also mixed.  
In El Salvador, the insurgent Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front was 
brought to the negotiating table and now participates in the electoral process.  
In Peru, President Fujimori unleashed the army on the Shining Path, deciding 
that the group’s political program – a seeming desire to turn the country into 
an Andean version of Pol Pot’s Cambodia – precluded a peaceful, negotiated 
outcome.  Although these two armed movements were not separatist in 
character, they ventured to speak on behalf of aggrieved populations.   
Perhaps in assessing the prospects for success when negotiating with 
a militant group, it is important to consider the group’s political program and 
the psychological profile of its leadership.  If for instance the Israelis believe 
Hamas to be closer in spirit to the Front de libération du Québec than to the 
Shining Path, then there is hope for a successful negotiated settlement. 
Ultimately, Dr. Khan sees the Nation State per se as the principal 
impediment to peaceful solutions.  Because Nation States guard their 
sovereignty so assiduously, they are loath to offer autonomy, let alone 
independence, to aggrieved populations.  As a long-term option, Dr. Khan 
proposes that Free States supplant Nation States.  The Free State has an 
administrative function, but no sovereignty, and he cites the status of the 
states of the United States, or the Member States of the European Union.  This 
is a novel approach, but it is unclear how a Free State could function without 
some controlling legal authority.  In the United States, all local laws and 
ordinances are subject to (federal) constitutional challenge; in the E.U., laws 
enacted at European level actually supersede national legislation.   
If Israel/Palestine were to become such a polity, what legal regime 
could be implemented to satisfy all citizens?  Gay rights legislation would 
almost assuredly be repugnant to devout Muslims.  And would liberals, 
whether religious or secular, tolerate a law requiring unmarried women be 
accompanied by male relatives when in public?  The notion of the Free State 
is made yet more complicated by Dr. Khan’s contention elsewhere in the book 
that Muslims do not wish to live under any legal regime that posits a 
separation of secular and sacred authority.  He may have suggested how to 
square this circle in his previous books, but it would have been helpful to 
readers of this one had he added one or two expositive paragraphs. 
Dr. Khan concedes that Free States seem utopian, and he is aware that 
they may never be realized.  In his defense, one should recognize that the 
origins of the Nation State are largely traceable to a specific time and place, 
viz. Europe under absolutism.  There is no reason to suppose that the current 
international order shall forever endure. 
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At times in the book, Dr. Khan lapses into polemics, though his 
analysis is otherwise dispassionate, as befits a legal scholar.  And although 
Dr. Khan is not an elegant writer, he is an engaging one, and his text is 
mercifully free of academic jargon.  However, this book – qua book – is 
disappointing because the reader is subjected to many syntactical defects, 
stylistic incongruities, typographical mistakes and misspellings.  Martinus 
Nĳhoff is among the world’s top-tier legal publishers, and recently became an 
imprint of Brill, a publishing house founded in 1683 and the holder of a Dutch 
royal warrant.  That Dr. Khan submitted his manuscript to Nĳhoff editors in 
less than perfect condition is forgivable; that those editors approved this book 
for publication in its present state is not. 
 
524Scott Rasmussen 
Sausalito, CA USA 
 
 
Liberal Reform in an Illiberal Regime: The Creation of Private Property in 
Russia, 1906-1915.  By Stephen F. Williams.  Stanford, CA: Hoover 
Institution Press, 2006.  Pp. xii, 320.  ISBN 0-8179-4722-1.  US$15 
(paperback). 
  
Stephen Williams’ Liberal Reform in an Illiberal Regime is a 
welcoming addition to the historiography of land reform in the late imperial 
Russia.  This book contributes to the ongoing discussion of whether the 
reform destroyed the commune as a traditional form of agricultural and 
political organization for Russian peasants or led to enhancing peasant 
productivity and fostering a bourgeois ethic among the peasantry.  The author 
stands firmly with the champions of the reform.  He recognizes the genuine 
role, effectiveness, and validity of a liberal reform initiated and implemented 
from above by a government that was neither liberal nor democratic, although 
he perfectly understands the systemic pitfalls and difficulties faced by the 
reformers.  
Unlike the existing voluminous literature on this subject, which is 
focused mostly on the explanation of the reform, review of its preconditions, 
and evaluation of its consequences, this book is dedicated to another aspect of 
the land reform.  Williams examines the impact that the reform had on the 
development of property rights in Russia and to what degree the changes in 
the property rights system influenced the general liberalization of Russian 
society.  A biographical sketch of Prime Minister Stolypin and a review of 
discussions regarding Stolypin’s policy in the Russian Duma and State 
                                                 
524 Mr. Rasmussen is a legal editor, and translator of Dutch and Spanish. 
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Council allow for a better understanding of the problems encountered during 
the course of the reform.   
The structure of this book reflects the logic of a judge, which the 
author as a judge applies every day in his courtroom.  Williams evaluates the 
facts, reviews the situation in Russian agriculture, analyzes the context of the 
reform, looks at the pre-existing property rights regime, examines how and 
why the reform was developed, evaluates the arguments of the reform’s 
opponents and proponents, explores peasant conditions before the reform, 
studies alternative options to the reform, and only after that does he resolve 
the main question regarding the role of private land ownership in the conflict 
between the end state of liberal democracy and the interests of those who hold 
power in an illiberal state.  
The book relies heavily on the available statistics of the period, 
analysis of legislation, and factual information provided by Western and 
Russian historical studies.  Critical analysis of the source materials, which 
include mostly Russian government publications and papers issued by party 
factions in the Duma, adds credibility to the research.  Special credit should 
be given to Williams for thoughtful selection of maps and charts, which 
enhance and visualize one’s understanding of the reform, as well as for the 
proper selection of terms in the glossary.  The statutory appendix, which 
includes excerpts from all major legal acts relevant to the reform translated 
into English, allows one to understand the language of law and compare one’s 
own conclusions with the author’s opinion.  An impressive bibliography 
reaffirms the author’s reputation as a noted scholar.     
The book starts with the general analysis of property rights and the 
role they play in civil society and liberal democracy.  The first chapter focuses 
on specifics of property relations in early 20th century Russia.  Williams 
acknowledges that collectivized rights of peasant allotment land seriously 
conflicted with liberalism and offered less opportunity for individual initiative 
when compared with individual ownership.  He presents the opinions of major 
political forces in the country on this issue by exposing their  lack of 
preparation to support the peasant acquisition of real property rights and their 
approach toward the reform and personally toward Stolypin, whose 
appointment as Prime Minister coincided with the dissolution of the First 
State Duma, another legal and political barrier on the way to liberal 
democracy in the country.   
The second chapter discusses the preexisting property rights regime 
and its dysfunction.  Williams analyzes the essence of the “repartitional” 
commune, which was the prevailing form of land ownership, and reviews its 
specifics, such as open fields, number of plots held by peasants, distance 
traveled between the village and remote tracts, decision making processes 
within the commune, tax burden assignments, and communal sociology.  He 
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concludes that up to the time of the Stolypin reform restrictive laws, high 
transaction costs, and policies of the communes’ elders made ending 
repartition and consolidating tracts a very complicated issue, even though the 
redemption obligations were cancelled in 1905.  The third chapter looks at 
peasant conditions just before the adoption of the reform.  This study appears 
to be very useful for comparing the reform to other proposed solutions to the 
“agrarian problem.”  This chapter contains a wealth of numerical information, 
which sometimes complicates the truly exciting reading about the daily life of 
Russian peasant families, their personal expenditures, activities on the grain 
market, and relations with the Land Bank.  However, these figures do provide 
an excellent documentary illustration to the text.    
Chapter 4 shows how strong the opposition to the reform was.  
Williams describes the composition of the First State Duma and the conflict 
between the government and the elected representatives regarding the agrarian 
reform.  Williams states that the government viewed the reform as part of an 
effort to build a rule of law state and an opportunity to avoid revolution.  The 
positions of the forces that confronted the government (landowners, peasant 
representatives in the Duma, members of the dominating Constitutional 
Democratic Party) and alternative projects are analyzed in this chapter.  This 
analysis allows the reader to understand better the depth of the conflict in 
which no social or political force could insist on its vision of the reform and 
comprehend legal maneuvering aimed at adopting reform legislation through 
the application of the Tsar’s “executive privilege” to pass emergency laws 
during the Duma’s recess.  The property rights reform initiated by Stolypin 
was just one part, although a fundamental one, of the agrarian reform in the 
late 19th and early 20th century Russia.  The collateral measures included, 
among others, the reduction of the term of conscription, phasing out of the 
poll tax, elimination of peasants’ collective responsibility for land taxes and 
redemption dues, cancellation of debts on redemption payments, and 
elimination of many other disabilities restricting peasants’ ability to divide 
property, undertake obligations, participate in civil service, and obtain higher 
education.  The investigation of how the government proceeded with these 
and other measures makes this book unique because no other research paints 
such a comprehensive picture of government efforts to make the reform 
succeed.   
  Chapter 5 is a rather technical but necessary chapter.  It describes the 
core reform policies and the choices given to individual peasants and 
communes.  It also evaluates the immediate effects of the reform and 
examines the variations in the reform implementation by region and size of 
peasant landholdings.  This part of the chapter is of special interest because it 
allows one to see how the reform’s results varied in neighboring and 
relatively similar provinces, such as Kursk and Voronezh, or Tula and 
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Ryazan.  Endless discussions about the purpose of the reform, its forceful 
implementation, and other reform design issues continued for the entire 
century since the reform was introduced.  The reform critics did not change 
their arguments and accused Stolypin of destroying the commune as a 
possible source of organized political resistance to the regime and of 
weakening the peasants politically by setting them at odds with one another.  
In regard to the issue of application of force, Williams proves that the official 
abuses of power were not endorsed or encouraged by central authorities and 
had nothing to do with the reform specifically.  After reviewing peasants’ 
complaints,  Williams concludes that the violations can be attributed to the 
Russian reality and could happen in the course of any government campaign.  
In response to accusations of intentional diminution of peasants’ political 
strength, Williams demonstrates how improved incentives and title conversion 
easily secured immediate gains in productivity, which for the majority of the 
peasants was of bigger importance rather than participation in political 
discussions.  Of interest is the statistical data on land consolidation and 
harvest growth that debunks implications that the authorities did not care 
about productivity or peasant preference.  The mistakes, flaws, and 
incompleteness of the reform are studied as well, and add to the objectivity of 
the analysis in chapter 6.  This careful detailing of the difficult balancing is 
one of the strengths of the book.   
In the last chapter of the book, Williams describes property rights as 
the key factor in assessing legal arrangements and their effects on the ability 
of political actors to resolve social conflicts and improve institutional 
efficiency.  He recognizes the following long-term implications of the reform: 
growth in agricultural productivity and peasant welfare, social transformation 
of Russian rural population, exploration of new lands in Siberia and Central 
Asia, strengthening property rights, and creation of prospects for a liberal 
democracy in Russia.  The book ends with a concise examination of current 
efforts of Russian reformers to introduce markets and property rights into the 
post-communist agricultural system. Williams draws an analogy between the 
Stolypin era and today based on the facts that, as in the past, some individuals 
favoring liberal reforms are at least nominally close to the core of power in 
present-day Russia, and the same questions about the necessity to secure the 
pillars of liberal democracy, which were raised in 1906, remain acute today.   
Overall, Williams has produced a well-written, easy-to-read book on 
a very complex subject.  His work will be of interest to students of property  
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and land relations in pre-revolutionary Russia.  The book would also be useful 
for graduate and advanced undergraduate students interested in Russian late 
imperial history.  
   
Peter Roudik 
Senior Foreign Law Specialist 
Law Library of Congress 
Washington, D.C. USA 
 
 
State Practice Regarding State Immunities/La Pratique des Etats 
concernant les Immunités des Etats.  Edited by Gerhard Hafner, Marcelo G. 
Kohen, and Susan Breau.  Leiden, The Netherlands: Koninklijke Brill NV, 
2006.  Pp. viii, 1502.  ISBN 90-04-15073-0.  €295.00; US$398.00. 
  
 In 2002, the Council of Europe (COE) launched a Pilot Project on 
State Practice Regarding State Immunities.  The project aimed to clarify 
practice by European States and to collect materials exemplifying that 
practice.  As part of the Pilot Project, the COE has made summaries of State 
practice documents, submitted by its member states, available in a database.525  
These State practice documents include national court decisions, national 
legislation, and other materials.  They address areas such as waiver of 
immunity, employment contracts, personal injury and damage to State 
property, and the effect of arbitration agreements. 
The COE engaged three organizations to prepare a joint study of State 
practice in this area:  The Department of European, International, and 
Comparative Law of the University of Vienna; the Graduate Institute of 
International Studies, Geneva; and the British Institute of International and 
Comparative Law.  Gerhard Hafner and his co-editors, Susan Breau and 
Marcelo Kohen, recruited additional scholars to write ten analytical chapters, 
which comprise Part I of the book. 
 In these chapters, the authors combine thorough dissection of State 
practice with comparisons to the provisions of three instruments:  the UN 
Convention, the unsuccessful 1972 European Convention on State 
Immunity,526 and, to a lesser extent, the 1991 International Law Commission 
(ILC) Draft Articles for a Convention on State Immunity.  These chapter 
contributions are uniformly excellent.  Each author manages to bring clarity to 
                                                 
525 http://www.coe.int/t/e/legal_affairs/legal_co-
operation/public_international_law/State_Immunities/default.asp#TopOfPage.  The 
28 contributions include a submission from Japan, an Observer State at the COE. 
526 CETS No. 74. Only eight states ratified this convention (ix). 
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an aspect of State immunities, from Kohen’s helpful treatment of the 
definition of “State” to August Reinisch’s well-organized explanation of 
immunity from enforcement measures.527  Stephan Wittich marshals a large 
body of case law into a coherent statement of the commercial transaction 
exception.  Kohen expertly unravels the two threads of diplomatic immunity 
and State immunity from a knotty mass of unclear case law and state practice.   
Unlike some academicians, the authors state their conclusions without 
endless qualifications, giving the reader a clear sense of the prevailing rules.  
The authors do not restrict their discussion to the examples of State practice 
summarized in Part II of the book.  Instead, they provide extensive discussion 
of, and references to, legal authorities from many jurisdictions.   
Part II of the book includes the summaries of State practice 
documents available in the COE database.  More importantly, it includes 
Susan Breau’s masterful digest of practice by Council of Europe members, 
organized under the main headings of jurisdictional immunity, immunity from 
execution, and waiver.  Subheadings, arranged according to the articles of the 
UN Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property,528 
allow easy access to summaries of decisions on topics such as employment 
contracts, intellectual property, and commercial transactions.  
For researchers seeking clarity on other aspects of State immunities, 
this book will be an invaluable resource.  I recommend this book to State 
officials, national judges, scholars, and practitioners engaged in business 
relations with foreign States. 
  Finally, a note on language.  The book’s essays, including Susan 
Breau’s extensive digest of State practice on immunities within the Council of 
Europe, appear both in English and French, on facing pages, identically 
numbered.  In the English-language version of the essays, French quotations 
from judicial opinions have not been translated into English.  On the French 
side, the occasional excerpt from English-language statutes and cases has 
been ably rendered in French.  The “National Contributions” from Andorra, 
Belgium, France, Switzerland, and Turkey appear only in French; the 
remaining 23 contributions are in English. 
 
Mary Rumsey 
Foreign, Comparative & International Law Librarian 
University of Minnesota Law Library 
Minneapolis, MN USA 
                                                 
527 Reinisch has published an expanded account of this problem as August Reinisch, 
European Court Practice Concerning State Immunity from Enforcement Measures, 17 
EUR. J. INT'L L. 803 (2006). 
528 GA Res. 59/38, annex (Dec. 2, 2004). 
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Practice and Policies of Modern Peace Support Operations Under 
International Law (International and Comparative Criminal Law Series). 
Edited by Roberta Arnold and Geert-Jan Alexander Knoops.  Ardsley, New 
York: Transnational Publishers, 2006.  Pp. vii, 303.  ISBN 1-57105-361-1.  
US$125.00.   
 
 According to a recent United Nations press release, UN peacekeeping 
deployments reached record levels in 2006 with over 80 thousand military and 
police personnel serving in 18 peacekeeping operations throughout the 
world.1 As the most immediate and effective method available to the UN for 
maintaining international peace and security, UN peacekeeping operations 
have undergone a dramatic transformation over the past twenty years.  The 
Security Council, freed from the constraints of Cold War politics, has 
expanded the scope of its operations to contain regional and internal conflicts 
throughout the world.  In his book, Council Unbound: the Growth of UN 
Decision Making on Conflict and Postconflict Issues after the Cold War2, 
Michael J. Matheson identifies three distinct “generations” of UN 
peacekeeping that illustrate this evolution and accretion of responsibilities. 
The first generation, most prevalent during the Cold War era, was the classic 
formulation of a light military force inserted into a conflict with the consent of 
the combatants and tasked with a limited mission of providing a buffer 
between belligerents, thus allowing for a cessation of hostilities.  UN 
operations in the Sinai and the Golan Heights are typical of this type of 
operation.  Second generation peacekeeping operations, on the other hand, 
were constituted in reaction to complex emergencies and were typically in 
response to an internal conflict requiring a response utilizing not only 
traditional military functions, but also requiring reconstruction of key 
economic and political institutions, and humanitarian assistance to non-
combatants.  Peacekeeping missions in Bosnia, Croatia and Haiti are 
representative of this more robust formulation.  Finally, UN peacekeeping has 
entered a third stage where, unlike earlier operations, military personnel are 
inserted into “failed state” situations and assume all governing functions in 
the territory until such activities can be returned to a reconstituted domestic 
government.  The UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia in 1991 represents 
the first major foray of the UN into this type of mission.  Thus, peace support 
                                                 
1http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/pko152.doc.htm 
2Matheson, Michael. Council Unbound: the Growth of UN Decision Making on 
Conflict and Postconflict Issues after the Cold, United States Institute of Peace Press 
(2006). 
212 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF LEGAL INFORMATION [Vol. 35.1 
 
 
operations have evolved from simple peace enforcement and management 
tasks to that of complex international crisis response and management 
operations typically involving institution building, law enforcement, and 
humanitarian crisis management.  
Given this dramatic transformation of peace support missions, a 
timely new collection of essays, Practice and Policies of Modern Peace 
Support Operations Under International Law, attempts to define and 
delineate the emerging parameters of this new paradigm.  This volume, the 
latest in Transnational’s International and Comparative Criminal Law Series, 
offers a detailed and multi-faceted perspective on the practice and policies of 
modern peace support operations.  As the editors state in their introduction, 
the main focus of the book is on evaluating modern peace support operations 
“in action,” and distilling the lessons learned from earlier experiences for the 
benefit of future operations.  Thus, Part 1 of the collection takes a historical 
look at peace support operations generally, outlines their use in establishing 
and promoting rule of law,  and presents the challenges they face in creating 
effective and legitimate post-conflict civil institutions and  judicial 
mechanisms to punish war criminals and establish order.  The section 
concludes with Gerhard Scherhaufer’s essay detailing the experiences of 
Austria’s deployment with the Kosovo Force (KFOR), which neatly illustrates 
the wide range of legal issues faced by a deploying force and the complex 
interplay between political and military goals and their ultimate 
implementation on the ground during a mission. 
Part 2 of the collection looks at the relationship of international law 
norms to modern peace support operations.  Co-author Roberta Arnold 
evaluates the applicability of the Geneva Conventions and the law of 
occupation to such operations and concludes that peacekeepers are indirectly 
bound by humanitarian law through their membership in their individual 
national armies.  Josephine Lett next examines the issues surrounding the 
extraterritorial reach of the European Convention of Human Rights to 
international peacekeeping operations.  Do individuals of non-member states 
enjoy the protections of the Convention when their territory is occupied by 
forces of member states? Lett comes to the conclusion that the instrument 
may very well travel with the troops and in certain circumstances can be 
invoked by individuals in the deployment area.  Part II concludes with 
chapters on the necessity of effective status of force agreements for the 
protection of peacekeeping forces and the efficacy of the use of non-lethal 
weapons.  Both essays serve to illuminate and underscore the hard-learned 
lessons of past deployments and their applicability to improving future 
operations.  
 Part 3 concludes the volume by looking at the interrelationship of 
peace support operations and international criminal law.  Co-editor Geert-Jan 
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Alexander Knoops examines the complex issues surrounding the liability of 
peacekeeping forces to military criminal sanctions and makes 
recommendations for reconciling conflicting domestic and international 
norms.  Stefano Failla discusses the issue of border control during a peace 
support operation using the Kosovo deployment of 1999-2005 as a case in 
point.  The necessity of re-establishing cross-border commercial activity and 
the orderly migration and repatriation of displaced persons is crucial to the 
success of such operations and cannot be neglected.  Pascal M. Dupont 
discusses the issue of criminal detention, again using the Kosovo crisis as an 
example.  He highlights the need for monitoring mechanisms for such 
detentions by the international community during such an operation.  Finally, 
this section concludes with a glimpse of the dark side of past peacekeeping 
deployments and the potential for criminal activity.  Specifically, authors 
Valerie Wahl and Sandra Katrin Miller look at the trafficking of human 
beings for the purposes of sexual exploitation that occurred during 
deployments in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Congo.  They outline the legal 
options available for curtailing such illicit trafficking and the need for 
establishing effective disciplinary mechanisms and standards for prosecuting 
peacekeepers and support personnel suspected of participating in such 
activities. 
On the whole, Practice and Policies of Modern Peace Support 
Operations provides a comprehensive overview of the complex 
responsibilities and challenges inherent in modern day peace support 
operations, and as such it is a welcome contribution to the literature.  It is 
unique in that the contributors go beyond the theoretical underpinnings of the 
subject by evaluating past operations and using them as predictors for future 
refinements.  The collection’s detailed treatment of the topic allows it to serve 
both as an introductory primer to the topic as well as a detailed guidebook to 
the many important issues to be considered when evaluating and planning 
such operations.  Readers will also appreciate the detailed index and table of 
cases that allow one to locate needed subject matter quickly.  Practice and 
Policies of Modern Peace Support Operations is a valuable addition to any 
comprehensive collection of literature on international peacekeeping and is 
also highly recommended to anyone interested in the ability of the 
international community to alleviate human rights violations through 
humanitarian intervention. 
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